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Book Review

DOOMED TO RE-REPEAT HISTORY:
THE TRIANGLE FIRE, THE WORLD TRADE
CENTER ATTACK, AND THE IMPORTANCE
OF STRONG BUILDING CODES
BY GREGORY M. STEIN∗
David Von Drehle, Triangle: The Fire That Changed America
(2003).
Jim Dwyer and Kevin Flynn, 102 Minutes: The Untold Story of
the Fight to Survive Inside the Twin Towers (2005).
Imagine this: You are a member of a commission charged with
recommending changes to the building code of a densely-packed
urban city, say New York. Your recommendation is that highrise office buildings are overly safe. Rather than dedicating so
much rentable space to fire stairs, rather than requiring costly
fireproof masonry construction, the city should relax its codes.
The odds of a tragedy in which the heightened protection makes
any difference are tiny, building owners will earn more money,
and there will be a net economic gain to the community.
You might think that no one in the immediate post-September
11 world would dream of offering such a recommendation.1 The

∗
Woolf, McClane, Bright, Allen & Carpenter Distinguished Professor of Law, University
of Tennessee (gstein@utk.edu). A.B. Harvard 1983; J.D. Columbia 1986. My thanks to Bill
Collins, Jeanette Kelleher, and the University of Tennessee College of Law.
1 Actually, they would. See Eric Lipton, City Reshaping Building Codes to U.S. Model,
N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2004, at A1. Lipton notes that “one of the most disputed parts of the
International Building Code [proposed for adoption in New York City] would allow
developers of many new buildings to use less fireproofing than is now required—a change
that would save developers considerable sums of money.” Id. See also infra notes 128-31
and accompanying text.
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memory of the World Trade Center attack2 is too fresh in
everyone’s minds. The vivid images of people jumping from high
floors are too intense; the photos of uniformed firefighters
stoically trudging up stairwells while evacuating office workers
step aside to let them pass too recent. Such a suggestion would
be decried as a naked attempt to profit by placing people at
unacceptable risk.
Now imagine this: Roughly sixty years have gone by, and there
have been no major building disasters since 2001. The building
industry argues, with decades of recent history to back it up, that
buildings are excessively safe and that the number of tragedies
in which the excess safety has mattered has proved to be low,
and perhaps zero. Spirited dissent from the few remaining old
fogies who have personal recollections of 2001 sounds as
antiquated as memories of Pearl Harbor do to most of us alive
today. It has not happened in so long, it probably will not
happen again.
That, more or less, is what happened in New York in 1968.
Fifty-seven years after the Triangle Waist Company fire, in
which 146 people trapped in the upper floors of an unsafe
building burned, jumped, or fell from a collapsed fire escape to
their deaths, New York City relaxed its safety rules for high-rise
buildings. Technology had changed. Firefighting skills had
improved. High-rise fires could be restricted to a few stories, and
in most cases people could move a floor or two away from the
danger and wait safely for emergency responders to complete
their jobs.
The 1993 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, coming a
quarter-century after these changes became effective, seemed to
prove the point: A bomb deliberately placed in the underground
parking garage of the complex had caused an enormous blast
followed by an intense fire, six deaths and over 1,000 injuries,
2 This Review refers to the events that occurred in New York on September 11, 2001,
as an attack, in the singular, although two different groups of men flew two different
airplanes into two different buildings. The question of whether these events constituted
one attack or two is of major importance to the buildings’ owner and insurers. See 9/11
Insurance Cases Appealed, NEWSDAY, Mar. 8, 2006, at A14. This article reports that
appeals are still pending in the dispute over $3.5 billion in insurance coverage and that
some relevant insurers appear to be bound by a form that treats the destruction of the
World Trade Center as one event while nine companies are bound by a different form that
treats the attack as two distinct events. Id.
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$300 million in property damage, and tremendous inconvenience,
but the deaths had resulted directly from the explosion itself.3 An
investigation led to some improvements in emergency evacuation
plans, but the buildings continued to operate with only minor
modifications.4
In his outstanding historical account, Triangle: The Fire That
Changed America,5 David Von Drehle makes the cogent case that
building-safety laws matter. And in their equally outstanding
retelling of the 2001 World Trade Center attack from the
perspective of those trapped inside the burning buildings, 102
Minutes: The Untold Story of the Fight to Survive Inside the Twin
Towers,6 Jim Dwyer and Kevin Flynn argue explicitly that we
have forgotten this lesson and are doomed to re-learn it the hard
way yet again. The Triangle fire may have “changed America,”
but it may not have changed America enough.
Neither book focuses solely on safety laws. Triangle seeks to
place the 1911 fire in the context of its era, devoting considerable
attention to the immigration patterns of the times that caused
very young Eastern European Jewish women and Italian women
to spend six days every week toiling for low wages under difficult
working conditions. Von Drehle describes early attempts at
unionization and the often violent consequences of these mostly
failed efforts. And he devotes much attention to the post-fire
trial and acquittal of the two owners of the Triangle factory.
Dwyer and Flynn take less of a historical approach and more of
a journalistic one, spending much of their time recounting
individual stories of heroism, luck, coincidence, and tragedy.
Relying primarily on interviews with survivors and with friends
3 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 279-80 (W.W. Norton & Co. 2004)
[hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT]. The 9/11 Commission Report notes, “The [1993]
explosion killed six people, injured about 1,000 more, and exposed vulnerabilities in the
World Trade Center’s and the city’s emergency preparedness.” Id. at 280. See also
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, FINAL REPORT ON THE COLLAPSE
OF THE WORLD TRADE CENTER TOWERS 91 (2005), available at http://wtc.nist.gov/
NISTNCSTAR1CollapseofTowers.pdf [hereinafter NIST FINAL REPORT] (estimating that
1993 World Trade Center bombing caused $300 million in damage).
4 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 278-81.
5 DAVID VON DREHLE, TRIANGLE: THE FIRE THAT CHANGED AMERICA (2003)
[hereinafter TRIANGLE].
6 JIM DWYER & KEVIN FLYNN, 102 MINUTES: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE FIGHT TO
SURVIVE INSIDE THE TWIN TOWERS (2005) [hereinafter 102 MINUTES].
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and family of those who perished, 102 Minutes follows 352
building occupants and rescuers from the time the first plane hit
until the time the second building collapsed, in an effort to recreate the confusion, tension, and terror experienced by those in
the buildings who survived the initial impacts. The authors also
devote considerable attention to the petty rivalries among the
different groups of emergency services workers—particularly the
terrible relationship between New York’s fire and police
departments—and how the resulting lack of coordination may
have cost more than two hundred firefighters their lives.
Despite these differences in approach and style, the
similarities between the two books and the parallels between the
two events they portray are remarkable. In each case, we are
introduced to the normal and ordinarily non-lethal financial
incentives and pressures that cause developers to squeeze the
maximum amount of rentable space onto each expensive square
foot of urban land. We come to understand the competing
stresses on city bureaucrats charged with drafting and enforcing
safety rules for high-rise buildings. We are treated to careful
descriptions of the structures that inevitably result from these
economic forces and safety rules. And we then watch in horror as
an unlikely but not inconceivable pair of worst-case scenarios
unfold, two miles and ninety years apart.7
I. TRIANGLE
Triangle is structured like a tragedy in three acts. The first
portion of the book, containing four chapters, sets the tone by
guiding the contemporary reader through the social history of
New York in the early 1900s. We are apt to think of factories of
7 As terrible as the Triangle fire and the World Trade Center attack were, it actually
is somewhat of an overstatement to call either tragedy a “worst-case scenario.” The
Triangle fire engulfed only the top three floors of a ten-story building; even on those
floors, approximately 370 of the 510 in occupancy escaped alive. TRIANGLE, supra note 5,
at building sketches following 180. In the collapses of the two World Trade Center towers,
more than 15,000 of the estimated 17,400 people inside the buildings at the time of the
first impact managed to escape alive. Moreover, the buildings were unusually empty
because September 11 happened to be both the day of a local primary election and the
first day of school, causing many workers to arrive late to the office. At peak occupancy,
the two towers would have held a total of about 40,000 occupants, and 14,000 of them
might have died because of the buildings’ inadequate egress capacity. NIST FINAL
REPORT, supra note 3, at xxxviii-xxxix.
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this era as “sweatshops,” but sweatshops were already becoming
obsolete by this time. Tenement sweatshops were an early form
of outsourcing, with manufacturers farming work out to
independent contractors who would then cram a handful of
recent immigrant laborers into their homes. Over time, the
bosses would “sweat” their workers for more and more output at
lower and lower pay—the average work week may have been
eighty-four hours.8 These sweatshops were dispersed and
atomized.
But by the early 1900s, the garment industry was
consolidating. Improvements in building techniques allowed for
the construction of much larger loft spaces than before, while the
increasing crowding in lower Manhattan demanded that more
and more floors be stacked on top of one another. At the same
time, equipment was becoming more mechanized and clothing
more standardized. Between 1901 and 1911, 800 loft buildings,
most of them unexceptional, were completed in Manhattan, or
roughly three every two weeks.9 The Triangle Waist Company
was an early example of this more modern production structure,
in which hundreds of workers were crammed into large factory
spaces, often on floors higher than the fire-safety equipment of
the time could reach.10
This consolidation of the workplace also set the stage for the
organization of workers into unions. Von Drehle spends a large
portion of this first act tracing the early efforts of garment
workers to bargain collectively for improved pay and working
conditions.
More generally, he describes the progressive
movement, which supported women’s suffrage, consumer
protection, and trade unions.11 A huge and still growing number
of Eastern European Jews had arrived in New York, and these
immigrants had no intention of returning to the pogroms of
Russia.12 They were firmly committed to their new homeland,
became citizens and candidates for office, and were more and

8 TRIANGLE, supra note 5, at 38-41.
9 Id. at 47.
10 Id. at 48.
11 Id. at 20.
12 See id. at 94-96 (describing impact of pogroms on Jewish immigration patterns).
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more active in political causes, generally on the left.13 Members
of New York’s more established society, including Alva Smith
Vanderbilt Belmont and Anne Morgan (daughter of J. Pierpont
Morgan), began championing progressive causes,14 and New
York’s Tammany Hall political machine quickly sensed which
way the political winds were blowing. Meanwhile, the owners of
the Triangle factory were among the most anti-union in
Manhattan.15
The central section of the book describes the tragedy itself. In
the first of two chapters, the author provides a vivid and detailed
minute-by-minute description of the very brief fire, illustrating
how a small spark, probably from a cigarette, quickly became a
three-story inferno that killed 146 people in the span of just a few
minutes. The second of these chapters focuses on the effects of a
particular miscommunication between workers on two floors that
led to a three-minute delay in spreading the alarm to the ninth
floor. This one lapse probably led to many preventable deaths.
Throughout this section, Von Drehle highlights how building
design and death toll were intimately linked, as each worker,
under extraordinary stress, saw her range of available options
becoming narrower and narrower until the only choice left for
most was whether to jump from the ninth floor to avoid an even
worse fate. Von Drehle focuses on individual workers trapped in
different portions of the eighth, ninth, and tenth stories,
highlighting how location, timing, and luck determined the
destinies of different pockets of trapped workers and even
different workers within each group: “The sheer speed of it must
be kept in mind. All the crucial things that happened inside the
factory that awful afternoon—the heroics, the terror, the tragedy,
the strokes of fortune both saving and deadly—transpired in a
handful of minutes and in the presence of a hideously voracious
fire.”16
Von Drehle emphasizes certain characteristics of the building
and its occupants in this section describing the fire. Given each
employer’s unrelenting need for healthy bodies and the new
13
14
15
16

Id. at 30.
Id. at 66-74.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 126.
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immigrants’ hunger for work, it was common for employees to
recommend their friends and relatives for jobs at their own
places of employment. As a result, many manufacturing plants,
including the Triangle factory, hired numerous members of the
same family. The owners of the Triangle factory had even hired
several of their own relatives.17
More ominous were the specific properties of the Asch
Building—the top three floors of which contained the Triangle
factory—that increased the death toll. A partition on the eighth
floor, “designed in such a way that only one employee could pass
through at a time,” was meant “to prevent theft of lace or fabric
or waists,”18 but ended up slowing egress from the factory floor.
A door on the ninth floor was kept locked, apparently for the
same reason.19 “[S]tairway doors in the Asch Building were
designed to swing inward, because the stairway landings were
too narrow to accommodate outward-swinging doors,”20 but
panicked workers piled against the doors, making them
impossible to open. Stairways were only thirty-three inches
wide; one policeman had to press himself against a wall to allow
terrified factory workers to flee.21 The factory’s innovative bins
for collecting cloth scraps, designed to keep the factory tidy,
effectively consolidated the kindling, transforming what was
initially a small blaze into a far more explosive conflagration
than it might have been in an older, messier operation.22
Worse still were those elements of the building specifically
designed for fire safety that actually increased the risk to the
occupants. The building had been built with two stairways plus
a fire escape.23 The fire escape, a “sorry apparatus,”24 was too
flimsy to bear the weight of fleeing employees and would
eventually tear away from the building and collapse,25 killing
about two dozen workers.26 Those few who were fortunate
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Id. at 116-17.
Id. at 119.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 117-18.
Id. at 127.
Id. at 147-48.
Id. at 167.

STEIN_MACRO[1]

774

4/23/2007 11:50:07 AM

ST. JOHN’S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 21:3

enough to make their way safely down this fire escape discovered
that it had released them at a basement skylight at the bottom of
an airshaft completely surrounded by the Asch building and two
of its neighbors, with no access to the street, as burning debris
started to filter its way down toward them.27 The city had never
confirmed that promised corrections to this obvious design flaw
were made.28
When the fire escape pulled away from the building because of
the weight of the people on it,29 some workers were impaled on a
fence at the bottom, while others, already burning, fell through
the skylight at the base and set off smaller fires in the
basement.30 Within minutes, this airshaft had become a
chimney, drawing the fire up to the ninth and tenth floors of the
Triangle factory.31 Those lucky escapees who did manage to find
their way down to the lobby were forced to wait there, because if
they walked out onto the sidewalk, they risked being hit by coworkers jumping or falling from upper-story windows.32 For
those plunging to the sidewalk, “the world . . . came to a sudden
end.”33
Even those who managed to make their way to the roof found
that they were trapped.34 The two structures abutting the
burning Asch building both were considerably taller than their
neighbor, and the fleeing workers had no way up.35 Fortunately,
a New York University law professor who was teaching a class in
one of these buildings heard the commotion and directed his
students to the roof of their own building, where they were lucky
to find two ladders that they used to evacuate the workers to the
neighboring structure.36
Inferior building design undoubtedly increased the total death
toll, but the outcome for individual workers often was a question
of fortune. Within eleven minutes of the start of the fire, and
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

Id. at 147-48.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 148.
Id.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 128.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 136.
Id.
Id.
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only six minutes after it reached the deadly ninth floor, viable
escape routes had been reduced to two, and these would last no
more than another ninety seconds.37 “To survive at this point
required decisiveness, a sudden burst of action, and good luck,
which was a vanishing commodity.”38 Von Drehle proceeds to
illustrate this point by tracing the movements of Ida Nelson,
Katie Weiner, and Fannie Lansner, three women who found
themselves standing together as the fire worsened.39 Nelson
followed a small group moving toward the roof and lived.40
Weiner leaped into a packed elevator and rode to safety on the
heads of the women standing beneath her in the car.41 “Having
made neither choice, Fannie Lansner was doomed.”42 In short,
Triangle workers “survived thanks to a short head start, or a seat
assignment near an exit, or by following the right mad rush in
one direction or another—or by ignoring the wrong rush. They
survived by acting a bit more quickly, or boldly, or brutally.”43
They most certainly did not survive because of the building’s
safety elements or the training provided by their bosses or their
bosses’ landlord.
The third act of the book, somewhat anti-climactic to read,
describes the aftermath of the fire, including the difficult task of
identifying the many badly burned bodies (six of which were
never identified) and the trial of the owners. But Von Drehle’s
most noteworthy point, and the observation that may tie the
Triangle fire most closely to events in the New York of the
following century, is his comparison of the Triangle fire to prior
disasters. “Many times before, a disaster was followed by a
predictable train of consequences: shock, then outrage, then
resolve, all leading to lip service dwindling into forgetfulness.”44
37
38
39
40
41
42

Id. at 149.
Id.
Id. at 150-52.
Id. at 151-52.
Id.
Id. at 152. The World Trade Center attack demonstrated similar randomness, of
course. See KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH? THE UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT
TO COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11, at 171 (2006) (reflecting that “[w]hoever is pulling
the strings, whatever cosmic force is making the call, it’s clear to me that life and death
can turn on the most innocuous events . . . . The random nature of who lives and who dies
was a common thread throughout the life of the 9/11 fund.”).
43 TRIANGLE, supra note 5, at 153.
44 Id. at 172.
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“Relief donations,” “mass meetings,” and “emotional speeches” do
not always translate into useful and productive reform.45 What,
observers of the time wondered, would be the legacy of the
Triangle fire?
Seen in light of these prior events, the aftermath of the
Triangle fire turned out better than contemporary critics might
have feared. Some local newspapers called for strengthened
building codes. New York’s governor established a powerful
Factory Investigating Commission; this group ultimately
proposed fifteen new labor and safety laws, eight of which were
enacted.46 The following year, reformers in the legislature
managed to push through more than two dozen more, mandating
such features as automatic sprinklers in high-rises, fire drills in
larger factories, and fire doors that were left unlocked and that
swung outward.47 Business interests objected vociferously, but
their arguments would not be heard until long after emotions in
the City had cooled. The politically astute response of the
Democratic Party to the disaster aided in cementing its status as
the party of urban liberals, a role that would help propel
Franklin Roosevelt into the White House. The building still
stands, now owned by New York University and filled with
science laboratories.48
II. 102 MINUTES
Unlike Triangle’s three-act structure, 102 Minutes focuses
more directly on the drama of the central act. Published less
than four years after the World Trade Center attack and aimed
at an audience that lived through the event, the book need not
re-create lost context for the reader. And with the local, national,
and international repercussions still unfolding, it would be
premature for the authors to reach any conclusive judgments
about the long-term effects of the disaster. Dwyer and Flynn
focus almost exclusively on the 102 minutes during which those
45
46
47
48

Id. at 173.
Id. at 212-14.
Id. at 215.
Id. at 327; see also NYU TODAY, NYU’s Brown Building is Named a New York City
Landmark, Apr. 21, 2003, http://www.nyu.edu/nyutoday/archives/16/08/PageOneStories/
BrownBuilding.html.
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still alive in the buildings sought to flee, remain, or rescue
others. Given the longer duration of these fires, the larger
number of people inside the buildings at the time, and the much
larger area affected, Dwyer and Flynn can easily expand this
central act to book length.
They do so in gripping and terrifying style, with hundreds of
accounts of survivors and witnesses from which to choose.
Painfully typical is the description of Judy Feeney, who receives
a seemingly routine phone call from her son, Garth, and asks him
what is new. He replies, “‘Mom, I’m not calling to chat . . . . I’m
in the World Trade Center and it’s been hit by a plane.’” His
mother, already watching the television coverage of the attack
but not previously aware that her son was attending a meeting at
Windows on the World, says, “‘Please tell me you are below it,’”
but Garth responds, “‘No, I’m above it. I’m on the top floor.’”49
Even if Dwyer and Flynn had achieved nothing beyond
personalizing and memorializing some of the victims in this way,
their accomplishment would be noteworthy.
The authors’ approach generally is chronological, rotating the
narrative among different people still inside the buildings and
tracing their actions as the 102 minutes tick away.
By
proceeding in this fashion, they can convey the high level of
confusion during this compressed time span. Few of those
struggling to survive knew what was going on outside of their
immediate physical environment. This fact is not surprising
when the authors describe the fates of various civilians but is
inexplicable and infuriating when they track the progress of
emergency services providers.
Interspersed throughout Dwyer and Flynn’s account is a
bluntly stated awareness of how institutional decisions made
long before September 11 had outcome-determinative effects for
many building occupants.
In their discussion of rescuers,
particularly those from the police and fire departments, they
emphasize how entrenched views, habits, and procedures ended
up reducing the odds of survival, particularly for firefighters.
“[I]nstitutional prerogatives and customs and obstinacy had
blanketed [Fire Battalion Chief Joseph Pfeifer] and his
49 102 MINUTES, supra note 6, at 37.
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colleagues in a thick fog of ignorance.”50 The concept of
situational awareness, invaluable in rapidly unfolding
emergencies and well known to military planners and some other
fire departments, had not yet penetrated the FDNY.51 Thus Chief
Pfeifer
knew less than the people he was trying to rescue. They
were being briefed on the phone by family and friends who
were watching TV. He had no TV and the fire chiefs were
getting only snatches of information from colleagues who
walked outside and craned their heads, trying to fathom
what was happening 1,200 feet in the sky.52
As the authors note, “The people fighting the two worst
building fires in the nation’s history had no video monitors. No
radio communications with other agencies. No way to get reports
from police helicopters and only a limited ability to communicate
among themselves.”53 And although the Police Department “had
installed [radio] boosters in 350 locations across the city to
amplify their signals,” the FDNY “had only a handful of boosters
in place.”54
Interdepartmental rivalries and incompatibilities exacerbated
these problems. The two groups of rescuers “did not like each
other.”55 In the past, “fistfights [had] broke[n] out at rescue
scenes. . . . [The] two agencies didn’t train together often or well.
They couldn’t talk to each other by radio because their
frequencies did not match. And they didn’t share equipment.”56
During the rescue effort, police helicopters took off without
firefighters aboard, leaving the fire chiefs with little idea what
was going on above them even as the police officers provided
regular reports to their superiors.57 The last joint police-and-fire
disaster drill at the World Trade Center had taken place in 1982,
50
51
52
53
54

Id. at 214-15.
Id. at 53.
Id.
Id. at 215.
Id. at 54. The difference in the number of radio boosters did not merely reflect
outmoded customs: Police officers often needed to contact dispatchers in distant locations
while firefighters more frequently communicated with colleagues just a few feet away. Id.
at 54-55.
55 Id. at 57.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 57-58.
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in response to an aircraft near-miss unrelated to terrorism.58
Fire dispatchers had to dial 911 if they wished to reach police
dispatchers.59
Deficiencies that before September 11 seemed to be little worse
than technological glitches or turf wars may have cost as many
as 200 firefighters their lives. The authors conclude that there
were roughly that many firefighters in the lowest forty floors of
the north tower when it fell.60 If these firefighters had
immediately begun to evacuate the north tower when the south
tower gave way, they would have had about half an hour “to go
down no more than thirty or forty flights of stairs, and many
people did, including eighty-nine-year-old Moe Lipson.”61 But
poor communications prevented most of these rescuers from
knowing that the other building had collapsed.
Surviving firefighters stated that they were unaware of the
seriousness of the danger in these final minutes62 even though
police helicopter pilots broadcast at least four radio warnings
predicting the building’s imminent failure, with one describing a
collapse as “‘inevitable’” and another stating “‘I don’t think this
has too much longer to go.’”63 For “twenty-nine minutes and
twenty-six seconds . . . [the FDNY was on] notice that total
calamity was not only possible but also imminent.”64 The
firefighters, meanwhile, continued their rescue efforts in a
doomed, nearly empty building from which almost all of the
approximately 6,000 civilians below the crash zone had already
escaped.65 Approximately 100 firefighters were seen resting and
58 Id. at 59.
59 Id. at 202; see also 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 321-22 (outlining

lack of coordination among first responders); Jim Dwyer, New Release Of 9/11 Tapes:
More Loss And Confusion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2006, at B1 (detailing lack of coordination
between police department and fire department regarding use of police helicopters).
60 102 MINUTES, supra note 6, at 251.
61 Id. at 250. The elderly Mr. Lipson descended by stairs from the 88th floor and had
reached the 27th floor when the other tower collapsed. Id.
62 Id. at 251-52.
63 Id. at 223; see also id. at 227, 250 (predicting failure of building).
64 Id. at xxii.
65 Id. at 250-52. The authors are particularly critical of then-Mayor Rudolph
Giuliani’s subsequent testimony about this failure. The former mayor implied that the
firefighters had worked on despite their awareness of the danger and intimated that
statements to the contrary amounted to questions about their bravery. Without
suggesting that the firefighters were not courageous, Dwyer and Flynn argue that the
only way to improve the outcome of future rescue efforts is to learn from the failures of
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catching their breath on the nineteenth floor shortly before the
second building fell.66
Even more frustrating than their discussion of institutional
failures among the various groups of rescuers is Dwyer and
Flynn’s acknowledgment of how construction and safety decisions
made as far back as the 1960s had negative consequences that
would not become fully apparent until the buildings were tested
on September 11. To begin with, New York City’s building code
had been relaxed in 1968 at the insistence of the real estate
industry and over the objections of the Fire Department.67
Moreover, as a bi-state agency, the Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey was not bound by even this weakened code when
it built the World Trade Center, although it claimed to have
complied voluntarily.68 This compliance must have been
grudging, however, as the Port Authority did not abide by other
New York City fire safety laws—also not binding on the Port
Authority—until after an industry challenge to these other laws
had failed.69 As a result, the towers nearly were constructed
without fire sprinklers.70
To be financially viable, the towers needed floors with large
expanses of space that were not divided by support columns.71
This challenge was met with the innovative use of lightweight
floors that both supported and were supported by the exterior
walls of the building.72 The use of this new, untested construction
method, however, meant that no one had experience in
fireproofing a structure of this type, and “[b]oth the architect and
September 11. They draw comparisons to drownings during the D-Day landing and note
that a frank acknowledgment of problems with the landing boats saved lives later in
World War II. Id.
66 See id. at 226-27, 243. The 9/11 Commission Report presents a more nuanced
version of these events, suggesting that some firefighters did evacuate the north tower
upon the collapse of the south tower, while others who remained did so for reasons that,
in retrospect, seem understandable. For instance, some firefighters were attempting to
locate colleagues who had strayed from their group, others were making their way out of
the building slowly because they were assisting non-ambulatory civilians, and some who
were off-duty when they reported did not have their radios with them. Some fire
personnel who successfully descended to the lobby reascended to help evacuate other
firefighters. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 307-08.
67 102 MINUTES, supra note 6, at 25.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 25-26.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 67.
72 Id.
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the structural engineer for the project refused to vouch for the
ability of the floors to withstand fire.”73 There is no evidence that
anyone ever conducted tests to determine whether these
elements of the structure were safe, even though such tests were
required by the city codes with which the Port Authority claimed
it would comply.74 Shortly after the buildings opened, an arsonist
set numerous small fires that caused several floors to buckle; no
tests were conducted after this event either.75
There were other indications that the Port Authority and the
Fire Department had reservations about the buildings’ safety
long before the 2001 attack. The Port Authority refused to allow
Windows on the World to run a gas line up the North Tower,
apparently out of concern for the effects that an uncontrolled gas
fire might have on the structure of the building.76 During the
course of litigation between the Port Authority and one of its
suppliers over the use of asbestos in the buildings, “[e]xpert
witnesses reported that hunks of the fireproofing, whether
asbestos based or not, had fallen off the steel, leaving it exposed.
In some cases, they said, it appeared never to have been applied
at all.”77 Following the resolution of this asbestos litigation, the
Port Authority decided to triple the thickness of the fireproofing
that had been sprayed on initially, which had been arbitrarily set
at one-half inch without testing and now was arbitrarily set at
one-and-one-half inches without testing.78 To minimize
73
74
75
76
77
78

Id.
Id. at 67-68.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 68.
Id.
See id. at 68-69. Inadequate fireproofing seems to have been a principal cause of
the buildings’ collapse. See NIST FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at xxxvii (concluding that
“the towers withstood the impacts and would have remained standing were it not for the
dislodged insulation (fireproofing) and the subsequent multi-floor fires”). The NIST report
also notes that the South Tower collapsed more quickly than the North Tower in part
because “there were early and persistent fires on the east side of the building, where the
aircraft had extensively dislodged insulation from the structural steel.” Id. at xxxviii. This
section of the report concludes that the towers would not have collapsed had there been
only minimal dislodging of the insulation. Id. at xxxviii, 149.
See also id. at 132 (noting that in tests, “uninsulated, it took just 13 min for the steel
surface temperatures [from a tower column] to reach 600˚ C, in the range where
substantial loss of strength occurs. When insulated with 1 1/8 in. of [spray-on
fireproofing], the same column had not reached that temperature in 10 hours”); id. at 154
(concluding that dislodging of fireproofing, rather than pre-impact thickness and
condition of fireproofing, led to collapse of buildings).
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disruption to tenants, however, this change was phased in only
as tenants renovated their space.79 Just thirty-one of the floors in
the two towers had been upgraded by September 11.80 When an
employee of one of the Center’s tenants, Terence McCormick,
began working in the building, his father, then a chief in the
FDNY, “had implored him to find a job elsewhere. Chief
McCormick believed that the towers were among the most
dangerous buildings in the city.”81
Those caught in the buildings confronted additional design
problems. Occupants could descend from upper floors either by
elevator or by stairs. Although each building contained ninetynine elevators, only two—one for passengers and one for
freight—ran from the top of the building to the bottom.82 The
buildings lacked the special refuge elevators that had become
standard in newer skyscrapers, designed to function even during
emergencies to help rescuers ascend and disabled occupants
descend.83 Safety resistors had been installed following the 1993
attack, to comply with updated code requirements that were
sensibly designed to prevent the doors from opening if an
elevator car stopped more than four inches from a landing.
Elevator mechanics at the complex had found this feature,
designed to avoid more routine accidents, to be too unforgiving.84
Expert mechanics were needed to override these resistors, but on
September 11, all of the buildings’ mechanics quite reasonably
evacuated after the second tower was attacked, leaving those
79 102 MINUTES, supra note 6, at 68-69.
80 See JOHN L. GROSS & THERESE P. MCALLISTER, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF

STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, STRUCTURAL FIRE RESPONSE AND PROBABLE COLLAPSE
SEQUENCE OF THE WORLD TRADE CENTER TOWERS lxxi (2005), available at
http://wtc.nist.gov/NISTNCSTAR1-6.pdf (describing upgrading of fire protection on
certain floors).
81 102 MINUTES, supra note 6, at 119.
82 Id. at 75; see also 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 278-79. Because of the
great height of the buildings, most of the elevators covered spans of only thirty or forty
floors, a design pattern that reduced the amount of potentially rentable space that had to
be dedicated to elevator shafts. 102 MINUTES, supra note 6, at 75. Passengers routinely
took express elevators to the sky lobbies on the 44th and 78th floors, where they would
transfer to local elevators. Id.; see 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 278. On a
typical day, there were at least 450,000 “passenger movements” by elevator. See ANGUS
KRESS GILLESPIE, TWIN TOWERS: THE LIFE OF NEW YORK CITY’S WORLD TRADE CENTER
206 (1999).
83 102 MINUTES, supra note 6, at 178.
84 Id. at 159.
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trapped in the elevators to attempt to pry the doors open from
the inside.85
The towers, like many lesser high-rises, were built under the
assumption that there would never be an occasion in which all
occupants would need to vacate at once. The theory was that the
evacuation of such a huge complex would be more hazardous
than having occupants remain on unimpaired floors, and the
chaotic uncontrolled emptying of the buildings after the 1993
bombing supported that belief.86 As a result, the number, width,
and placement of the emergency stairways were insufficient to
evacuate full buildings, or even partly full buildings, in their
entirety.87 The Empire State Building, completed in 1931 under
the more demanding standards required by an earlier code, has
nine stairwells at its broad base and six that run the entire
height of the building, one of which serves as an air-locked fire
tower that is supposed to be more impervious to smoke.88 Each of
the 1,350-foot tall World Trade Center towers, with slightly
greater height, nearly double the rentable square footage, and
the capacity for about 33% more occupants, had only three
stairwells throughout—the same number as would have been
required for a seventy-five-foot building—and no fire tower.89 All
three of these stairwells were bunched together in the least
rentable space in the core of the building.90 Two of the three
stairwells in each building went only as far down as the
mezzanine, a feature that one fire chief had described as “‘a
major building design flaw’” in a report commissioned after the
1993 bombing.91 Those leaving the building via these stairways
then had to reach street level by escalator.

85 Id. at 160-62.
86 Id. at 64-65. Major fire departments and the insurance industry supported the

building industry in this belief. Id. at 65. The 9/11 Commission Report notes, “The Port
Authority acknowledges that it had no protocol for rescuing people trapped above a fire in
the towers.” 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 281.
87 See 102 MINUTES, supra note 6, at 65 (noting that, at the time of the attack, two
design groups were arguing for even narrower fire stairways, a change that would have
added thousands of rentable square feet to buildings as large as the World Trade Center
towers).
88 Id. at 109.
89 Id. at 109-10.
90 Id. at 109-10, 112.
91 Id. at 117 (quoting a report written by Chief Donald Burns).
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III. THE EBB AND FLOW OF BUILDING CODES
Building codes are a broad category of laws and regulations
designed to establish minimum health and safety standards for
the physical structure of buildings. They cover a wide range of
construction matters, ranging from structural loads to
construction materials to building system installations to safety
devices.92 Building codes have been traced back at least as far as
the Code of Hammurabi.93 Early American building restrictions
included 1625 rules in New Amsterdam pertaining to roof types,
locations, and coverings, and 1630 prohibitions on wooden
chimneys and thatched roofs in Boston.94 New York adopted the
nation’s first building code in 1850.95 Several trade organizations
began promulgating building codes during the first part of the
twentieth century, and different codes garnered acceptance in
different regions of the United States. The Building Officials
Conference of America (BOCA) published its Basic Building Code
in 1950, which was widely adopted in the Northeast and
Midwest.96 But large cities, facing unique construction issues and
distinctive political pressures, began to develop their own codes,
an approach that New York City followed when it adopted its
new code in 1968,97 the year in which construction of the World
Trade Center began.

92 CHARLES S. RHYNE, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF BUILDING CODES 4 (1960); see also id.
at 61 (“Stated simply, a building code is a set of rules to keep people from getting hurt.”);
Sara C. Galvan, Note, Rehabilitating Rehab Through State Building Codes, 115 YALE L.J.
1744, 1746 (2006) (observing that codes “create incentives to build certain types of
structures, they establish economic biases toward particular materials and construction
methods, and they impact urban layouts”); Lipton, supra note 1, at A1 (describing codes
as “the city’s DNA, shaping its appearance and its workings”).
93 See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 444 (3d ed. 2005) (citing MARTHA T. ROTH, LAW COLLECTIONS FROM
MESOPOTAMIA AND ASIA MINOR 125 (1995)) (quoting provisions from the Code of
Hammurabi that provide certain remedies for a homeowner against the builder);
MASONRY: THE VOICE OF THE MASON CONTRACTOR, Building Codes, July 2003,
http://www.masonrymagazine.com/7-03/air1sb.html (tracing building codes back
approximately 4,000 years). The Code of Hammurabi had some real teeth to it, providing
for the death penalty for certain violations. ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra.
94 See RICHARD L. SANDERSON, CODES AND CODE ADMINISTRATION: AN INTRODUCTION
TO BUILDING REGULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 6-7 (1969) (describing and discussing
these two early building laws).
95 ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 93, at 447.
96 SANDERSON, supra note 94, at 9.
97 Id. at 9-10.
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The wisdom of a building code provision, like that of any other
health and safety measure, involves balancing the costs of
enacting and enforcing it against the benefits to be gained from
it.98 The costs of a building code measure include both the
expense of constructing or retrofitting a structure to comply with
the law and the income that is lost over time as a result of
implementing the law. For example, if a city were to increase the
minimum required width for fire stairs in new buildings, the cost
of this law to the builder of a new structure would be equal to the
sum of the cost of constructing and maintaining wider fire stairs
(minus the cost of constructing and maintaining whatever else
would have occupied that space) and the discounted present
value of all rental income lost because of the floor area that now
must be dedicated to fire stairs rather than to rentable office
space. The benefit of this change would be equal to the statistical
value of all lives saved, injuries avoided, and property damage
averted in that structure, multiplied by the likelihood of these
tragedies occurring at all, plus the “reassurance factor” enjoyed
by building occupants aware that they are working in a safer
building.
For many possible building code provisions, it is far easier to
calculate the costs than the benefits. A builder can determine
the additional price of building wider fire stairs and estimate the
price of maintaining them,99 and can calculate how much extra
space will need to be devoted to these wider stairs and forecast
the discounted present value of what that space might rent for
over the useful life of the building. The benefits—harms
avoided—are much harder to estimate. No one knows the
likelihood of a natural or human-caused disaster, and planners
can only guess how much death, personal injury, or property
98 The classic statement of this rule was offered by Judge Learned Hand in United
States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand, J.) (stating that
“if the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon
whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL.”); see also Conway v.
O’Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940) (L. Hand, J.) (observing, “The degree of care
demanded of a person by an occasion is the resultant of three factors: the likelihood that
his conduct will injure others, taken with the seriousness of the injury if it happens, and
balanced against the interest which he must sacrifice to avoid the risk.”).
99 See, e.g., Jim Dwyer & Eric Lipton, 3-Year Federal Study of 9/11 Urges Rules for
Safer Towers, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2005, at A1 (estimating that development costs would
increase by two to five percent if one recommended set of post-9/11 changes were
implemented).
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damage will result from any such disaster. And these numbers
are moving targets that we continuously update to factor in all
events that have occurred in the past, particularly in the recent
past: The odds of a major terrorist attack on an office building
surely seemed higher on September 12, 2001 than they had fortyeight hours earlier. There also are intangible costs and benefits
to consider, and these can be extremely difficult to quantify. A
building that is markedly safer may give its occupants a greater
sense of ease, as just noted, or it may constantly remind them of
their vulnerability.100 It may be more or less comfortable, more or
less attractive, more or less rentable.
Costs and benefits do not exist independently and can affect
each other synergistically. Terrorists might choose to attack
poorly protected buildings because they are easy targets, or they
might select heavily fortified structures—particularly iconic or
symbolically significant ones such as embassies—in the belief
that a successful attack on a fortress demonstrates their strength
and will be more demoralizing to victims and to the general
public. In addition, the cost-benefit calculus is constantly
shifting. It is widely believed that the rash of airline hijackings
several decades ago abated at least in part because airplanes
were redesigned so that hijackers could no longer parachute
safely from an airborne passenger plane. Building costs increase
after natural disasters, as labor and materials become relatively
scarce and people react—and sometimes overreact—to the
hurricane or tsunami that is freshest in their minds.101 Similarly,
as an event fades from memory, the temptation is to argue that
some restrictions enacted in response to it should be relaxed, that
the benefits of building code changes were overstated in the

100 See, e.g., David W. Dunlap & Glenn Collins, In Revised Design, Freedom Tower
Sheds Its Look of Bulky Armor, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2006, at B1 (describing earlier
versions of plan as “‘a fortress,’” “monolithic,” “a ‘concrete bunker,’” and “‘more
intimidating than inviting’”).
101 See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEG.
STUD. 199, 203-04 (2006) (noting, “According to the availability heuristic . . . , the
probability of an event is estimated after an assessment of how easily examples of the
event can be called to mind. . . . [A]vailability bias might be said to arise when the
availability heuristic leads people to make predictable errors in assessing
probabilities. . . .”).
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emotional aftermath of the tragedy. And different types of
structures merit different levels of protection.102
Remember also that building professionals usually are the only
people who spend much time thinking about building codes.
Unless there has been a recent disaster, it is unlikely that
citizens will lobby their local government representatives to
strengthen building codes for greater worker safety or that a
candidate will run on a pro-building-code platform. Those in
building-related trades, however, may well lobby those same
representatives on a regular basis to weaken codes as a means of
reducing construction and operating costs. Their efforts may be
sufficient to outweigh counter-arguments from the small number
of customary opponents, such as building and fire officials.103
The combined effect of these factors suggests that the strength
of building codes can be expected to swing like a pendulum, with
local governments beefing up codes dramatically in response to
the outcry that follows a major tragedy and then weakening
them gradually as that disaster recedes in the rearview mirror.
Immediately after a crisis, the perceived benefits of a
strengthened code, which will have become newly evident to the
general public, will exceed the perceived costs, which had always
been apparent to those in the building industry.104 As time
passes uneventfully, the public turns its focus elsewhere and the
balance of pressure on public officials slowly shifts the other way.
This pattern of reform and relaxation based on perceived costs
102 See Eric Lipton, Investigation Of Towers’ Fall Is Criticized, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27,
2005, at B1 (“‘Why on earth would you expect the Landmark Center on Six Forks Road in
Raleigh to have the same standards, preparation against terrorist attack, as [Chicago’s]
John Hancock Center would have?’ asked Representative Brad Miller . . . . ‘It has got to be
a balance of cost against risk.’”).
103 See, e.g., id. (quoting a letter from The Building Owners and Managers
Association International, representing the real estate industry, to Representative
Sherwood Boehlert, chair of the House Science Committee, stating, “‘This
recommendation is just too costly to implement . . . . How many building collapses have
there been, ever?’”); Eric Lipton & Jim Dwyer, Time for Drastic Changes in Tall
Buildings? Experts Disagree, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2005, at B1 (noting that firefighters
are rarely involved in the process of updating codes); see also SANDERSON, supra note 94,
at 31 (“The degree of influence of one group may adversely affect the welfare of another
and it is necessary to exercise constant knowledgeable vigilance to protect the best
interest of the general public.”).
104 There can be resistance to strengthening codes even immediately after a disaster.
“Historically, major revisions in building codes have often followed catastrophes or
spectacular fires . . . . Even so, the debate over code changes often drags on for years, as
groups with competing interests attempt to influence the process, debating costs and
benefits.” Lipton & Dwyer, supra note 103, at B1.
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and benefits seems to be common no matter what the actual costs
and benefits are, to the extent these actual components can even
be calculated. That is why Boston banned wooden chimneys and
thatched roofs in 1630105 and why the New York State
legislature, spurred by reformers such as Frances Perkins,
passed numerous building safety laws in response to the Triangle
fire.106
The code amendments that were enacted in response to the
Triangle fire meant that buildings would be more expensive to
build, and they met with predictable objections from the real
estate industry at the time.
One Factory Investigating
Commission member who represented real estate interests
referred to the “‘infinitesimal proportion of the population’” killed
in factory fires. He was shouted down by a union representative
who noted, “‘They were human souls. It was a hundred percent
for them.’”107 The public reaction following this immense tragedy
was sufficiently prolonged and deep that the reformers were able
to see many of their recommended policies implemented.
But the same real estate interests that cannot block the
passage of code amendments in the wake of a tragedy can
attempt to undo them later. As time passes without further
incidents, it begins to appear as though the initial response
miscalculated the cost-benefit ratio.
Building industry
representatives may emphasize how excessively strong codes are
leading to wasteful overspending on safety, while the earlier
supporters of these stronger codes may cease to focus on this
issue.
New York’s code revision process, which began in 1962, came
in response to building industry arguments that the 1938 code
was obsolete. Why waste space—which is to say money—on
“outsize-seeming safety requirements” or “artifacts of an earlier,
more plodding age” that are “an imprudent and uneconomical
105 SANDERSON, supra note 94, at 6.
106 TRIANGLE, supra note 5, at 212-17; see also Julia Vitullo-Martin, Thinking about

Building Codes, THE MANHATTAN INSTITUTE’S CENTER FOR RETHINKING
DEVELOPMENT, Nov. 2004, http://www.manhattan-institute.org/email/crd_newsletter1104.html (describing New York’s building code, in an article arguing for reform, as “a
reactive document, with its most important modifications occurring after a catastrophe,
such as a deadly fire or building collapse, or following economic hardship, such as the
Great Depression.”); supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
107 TRIANGLE, supra note 5, at 216.
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regulation of business”?108 New York’s 1968 building code was
less protective of building tenants than some of the post-Triangle
reforms it replaced because the perceptions of costs and benefits
had changed since the Triangle fire.
Before the new code was even adopted, the Port Authority—
which was not bound to follow city laws—announced that it
nonetheless would abide by the revised rules.109 The Authority
implied that this discretionary safety consciousness was
innovative and forward-looking, but by volunteering to comply
with the newer code rather than with the older one, it also was
saving on construction costs.110 A councilman noted that if the
Pan Am building had been built in accordance with the newer
code, its owners “would have had 2 percent more rentable space
on each floor. That was worth about $1.8 million annually in
1968.”111
One of the reasons New York was able to build the world’s two
tallest buildings during the early 1970s was that new
construction methods coupled with these relaxed code
restrictions made structures of this type economically feasible for
the first time ever.112 “As it happened, the World Trade Center
was planned at a moment of radical transformation in the
construction of tall buildings, and its owner, the Port Authority,
availed itself of those changes in spectacular fashion.”113 By the
time New York City revised its building code, more than half a
century had passed since the Triangle fire, and certain safety
measures were viewed as “the wasteful legacies of a bygone era
that lacked modern fireproofing techniques.”114

108 102 MINUTES, supra note 6, at 105, 108.
109 The NIST Final Report concludes that the buildings generally complied with the

then-applicable New York City Building Code and that any minor deviations had little
effect on the outcome for the buildings and their occupants. NIST FINAL REPORT, supra
note 3, at xl.
110 102 MINUTES, supra note 6, at 105.
111 Id. at 107.
112 The buildings were also exceptionally lightweight. “In essence, [each] building is
an egg-crate construction that is about 95 percent air, explaining why the rubble after the
collapse was only a few stories high.” Thomas W. Eagar & Christopher Musso, Why Did
the World Trade Center Collapse? Science, Engineering, and Speculation, JOM, Dec. 2001,
at 8, 8, available at http://www.tms.org/pubs/journals/JOM/0112/Eagar/Eagar-0112.html.
113 102 MINUTES, supra note 6, at 103.
114 Id. at 254.
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These cost savings, of course, came with a hidden price tag of
their own, in the form of reduced safety benefits. The new code
relaxed fire protection measures on the theory that the old rules
were overly safety-conscious.115 Under the new code, buildings
would need fewer fire stairs and no fire towers, and the original
plans for the World Trade Center, which included fire towers,
were modified to eliminate them.116 The fire stairs that remained
could be located closer together in the building core, far from the
more valuable window space that tenants coveted. Fire ratings
for columns and floors would be reduced. New, less costly
materials could be used.
It is difficult to know whether these code amendments were a
sensible reflection of changed technology or a simple cave-in to
the economic interests of the real estate industry by those
charged with protecting the public. Dwyer and Flynn make a
compelling case that the latter view is correct. The most
persistent theme throughout 102 Minutes is that the 1,500 people
who survived the initial attacks yet were unable to escape the
buildings “were trapped by circumstances that had been the
subject of debates that began before the first shovelful of earth
was turned.”117 The authors raise this point in the book’s
introduction and emphasize it throughout, including in the book’s
closing pages, where they remark that the fate of these victims
“was sealed nearly four decades earlier, when the stairways were
clustered in the core of the building, and fire stairs were
eliminated as a wasteful use of valuable space.”118 The benefits of
115 Id. at 106.
116 See H.S. LEW ET AL., NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY,

FEDERAL BUILDING AND FIRE SAFETY INVESTIGATION OF THE WORLD TRADE CENTER
DISASTER: DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE OF STRUCTURAL AND LIFE SAFETY
SYSTEMS 199 (2005), available at http://wtc.nist.gov/NISTNCSTAR1-1.pdf (reprinting
1965 letter from Port Authority Planning Division Chief Malcolm P. Levy to building
architect Minoru Yamasaki in which author instructs that in light of the Port Authority’s
decision to comply with a draft of the new building code, “the tower core should be
redesigned to eliminate the fire towers and to take advantage of the more lenient
provisions regarding exit stairs”).
See also id. at 153-54 (listing elements of towers that complied with newer code but not
older one, including elimination of fire tower, reduction in number of fire stairs from six to
three, reduction in width of doors leading to fire stairs, allowing all stairs to exit through
a lobby rather than through an enclosed fire corridor, reduction in fire rating of shaft
walls from three hours to two, and others).
117 102 MINUTES, supra note 6, at xxiii.
118 Id. at 243.
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safety provisions seemed more tenuous as the Triangle fire faded
from memory, while technological advances suggested that
builders could attain a comparable or superior level of safety at
lower cost. As a result, “[a]t the start of the twenty-first century,
young men and women in the prime of their days [would], once
again, leap[] from windows to escape the heat of a tall
building.”119
The 9/11 Commission paints a less negative view of the
outcome for the people inside the two towers that were built and
upgraded under the post-Triangle building code.
The
Commission notes that between 16,400 and 18,800 civilians were
in the towers when the first plane hit.120 Aside from first
responders, security personnel, volunteers who entered the
building after the impacts, and those on board the airplanes, no
more than 2,152 people died at the complex.121 Out of this
number, nearly 95% of those whose position at the time of impact
can be determined were located above the respective impact
zones.122 Only 110 civilians, just 5.36% of those who died, were
located below the crash sites.123 Moreover, the successful
evacuation of so many people was aided by building upgrades
and training procedures implemented after the 1993 attacks.
“Stairwells remained lit near unaffected floors; some tenants
relied on procedures learned in fire drills to help them to
safety . . . . Rudimentary improvements, . . . such as the addition
of glow strips to the handrails and stairs, were credited by some
as the reason for their survival.”124 Most of those below the crash
were able to evacuate in less than an hour; the 1993 evacuation
took four hours.125 In short, if you were below the crash site in
your building at the time of impact, you probably lived, but if you

119 Id. at 254-55; see also FEINBERG, supra note 42, at 101 (quoting victim’s widow as
stating, “I want to sue the architects and the builders of the World Trade Center, who
constructed buildings that did not even meet New York City Building Codes, buildings
that were so flawed in their design and structure that they crumbled to dust as the world
watched.”).
120 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 316.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
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were above it, you probably died.126 Given the force of the
impacts and the catastrophic damage each airplane caused to the
floors it struck, the 9/11 Commission implies that the buildings
performed fairly well.
These two views may not be incompatible.
The 9/11
Commission’s focus on those below the crash sites suggests that
the buildings stood long enough for nearly all of them to escape.
Dwyer and Flynn, by contrast, argue that the buildings’ design
ensured that those above the crash sites never had a chance, and
that more reliable communications and better evacuation
procedures might have saved many of the rescuers who entered
the buildings after the impacts. Perhaps the combined lesson of
these two investigations is that we should focus our attention on
those elements of the 1968 code that were ineffective and
demand reexamination.127
New York City is in the process of overhauling its building code
more extensively than it has ever been modified in the past. The
September 11 attack is only part of the reason for this rewriting;
the project also is motivated by a desire on the part of the
building industry to persuade New York to adopt a standard code
that conforms to the rules in effect in other parts of the country.
While “[a]dopting a so-called model code is expected to save New
York builders tens of millions of dollars,” some of the proposed
language is less demanding than that of the code it will
replace.128 There is general agreement that reform is long
overdue, but different constituencies disagree as to precisely
what changes are merited. Critics of some of the proposals note
that fire safety might actually be reduced and argue that a one-

126 Id. at 281.
127 See Eagar & Musso, supra note 112, at 11 (“It would be impractical to design

buildings to withstand the fuel load induced by a burning commercial airliner. Instead of
saving the building, engineers and officials should focus on saving the lives of those inside
by designing better safety and evacuation systems.”).
128 Lipton, supra note 1, at A1 (noting that adoption of model code will save New
York builders millions of dollars because model code is less stringent); but see The
American Institute of Architects New York Chapter Supports Adoption of the International
Building Code, http://www.aiany.org/chapter/statements/ibc_testimony.pdf (last visited
Mar. 14, 2007) (discussing the adoption of a model code and stating that “[c]urrent New
York City regulations that are more stringent than the national code will be incorporated
into the new Code. These include the recently-adopted changes based on specific response
to the World Trade Center Disaster . . . .”).
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size-fits-all code is poorly suited to an unusually dense city.129
Supporters argue that overprotective codes deter needed
development.130 The city’s building commissioner states simply
that “‘it’s up to us to balance safety and economic
development.’”131
CONCLUSION
Bad things happen, and even if it were possible to prevent bad
things from happening, the costs of doing so sometimes will
exceed the overall benefit. The New York Times Magazine
offered a brief article several years ago illustrating the costs and
benefits of making commercial airliners more accident-proof.132
While some of the suggested measures seem both inexpensive
and wise, others are ridiculously excessive, and the costs of
implementing them undoubtedly would persuade many to travel
in their far more dangerous automobiles.133 One commentator
has argued that stricter airport security measures may reduce
the frequency of terrorist attacks, but that the attacks that do
occur will be far more severe.134 And some tragedies, whether
induced by human action or natural conditions, simply result
from the confluence of a series of unlikely events all occurring at
once. If the Triangle workers had received an extra three
minutes to evacuate, as they might have, many more would have
survived. If the hijacked planes had struck the towers at
129 See Sewell Chan, Sept. 11 Has Spurred Only Modest Changes in City and
National Building Codes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2006, at B1 (noting that “9/11 has not been
a turning point for code revision, in the way past disasters were—like the Triangle
Shirtwaist fire of 1911.”).
130 See Julia Vitullo-Martin, Building Code Blues: Will New York be Left Behind?,
THE MANHATTAN INSTITUTE’S CENTER FOR RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT, Jan. 2005,
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/email/crd_newsletter01-05.html (arguing that “New
York City has routinely victimized itself with its own sense of exceptionalism” and that
unions and corrupt officials are the primary beneficiaries of the existing code).
131 Lipton, supra note 1, at A1 (quoting Patricia J. Lancaster).
132 Adam Bryant, The Safest Plane, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 20, 1997, at 36.
133 Id. at 36-38 (contrasting, for example, installing ground-proximity warning
systems, which would cost thirty-five cents per ticket, with installing anti-missile systems
on each jet, which would cost $29.41 per ticket, and noting industry rule of thumb that
the number of passengers drops by 1% with each 1% increase in ticket prices).
134 Malcolm Gladwell, Safety in the Skies, NEW YORKER, Oct. 1, 2001, at 50 (“This is
the great paradox of law enforcement. The better we are at preventing and solving the
crimes before us, the more audacious criminals become. . . . When you get very good at
cracking down on ordinary hijacking . . . what you are left with is extraordinary
hijacking.”).
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different angles or on different floors, more people might have
escaped or one or both buildings could still be standing. So we
are destined to live with some level of risk, either because it is
unavoidable at any price or because it is unavoidable at any
affordable price.
If we make certain safety precautions optional, then buildings
will be in a position to compete with each other on safety, just as
they compete on other building features. This would likely place
some workers in less safe condition than others, because their
employers choose not to pay extra to protect them. If we
mandate these same precautions, however, then every buyer or
tenant will be forced to pay for these protections. These owners
or occupants then would pass the cost of these protections
forward through the economic system into the prices of their
goods and services, and the cost would be further diffused
throughout society.
Everything would become a bit more
expensive, as we pay for partially danger-proofing ourselves.
This safer city, however, would have to compete with other
localities in the United States and elsewhere that may mandate a
lower standard.
And we constantly restrike this balance:
“Though the risk of death in the American workplace has been
cut to one-thirtieth of what it was in 1911, there are still some
shops and factories that would be instantly recognizable to . . .
the Triangle dead.”135 Perhaps the best we can hope for is that
we remain aware of the tradeoffs involved and make our
decisions after a thorough discussion of what we gain and what
we lose.136
Most people would prefer not to live and work in bunkers, and
developers do not want to raise prices and build nothing else. At
the same time, while most of us will never be the victim of a
terrorist attack, a fire, or a hurricane, no one wishes to feel
overly vulnerable. We must balance these factors and many
others and decide how much safety we are willing to pay for. As
we continue to make these assessments, it is critically important
135 TRIANGLE, supra note 5, at 267.
136 Cf. Kevin Baker, On 9/11, Before the Horrible Became the Unimaginable, N.Y.

TIMES, Jan. 21, 2005, at E41 (reviewing 102 Minutes and concluding, “Yet if this brilliant
and troubling book gives us any indication, we will probably be just as unprepared the
next time.”).
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that we not let our judgment be clouded by fading memories or
one-sided lobbying any more than we do by overreaction. We do
not wish to look back fifty years from now and wonder why we
did not make adequate changes after the World Trade Center
attack, or why we slowly undid the changes we made. It may not
be sensible to build the perfect building, but we certainly have
learned that some protections are worth the price. It is up to us
to decide how much we are willing to pay to live in a sensibly
safer world.

